In this work we consider the communication setting in which a sender, Alice, wishes to communicate with a receiver, Bob, over a channel controlled by an adversarial entity, Calvin, who is myopic. Roughly speaking, for blocklength n, the codeword X n transmitted by Alice is corrupted by Calvin who must base his adversarial decisions, on which characters of X n to corrupt and how to corrupt them, not on the entire view of the codeword X n but on Z n , the image of X n through a noisy memoryless channel. More specifically, our communication model may be described by two channels. A memoryless channel p(z|x) from Alice to Calvin, and an arbitrarily varying channel from Alice to Bob, p(y|x, s) governed by a states S n determined by Calvin. In standard adversarial channels, the states S n may depend on the codeword X n , however in our setting S n depends only on Calvin's view Z n .
I. INTRODUCTION
In the study of point-to-point communication, a sender Alice wishes to transmit a message U to a receiver Bob over a noisy channel governed by a jammer Calvin. To do so, she encodes U into a length-n vector X n and transmits it over the channel, resulting in the received word Y n . Two types of channel models that have seen significant studies over the last decades are the memoryless channel model, e.g., [1] in which the channel is governed by a conditional distribution p(y|x) which is completely oblivious [2] (or "blind") of the message X n being transmitted and the adversarial (omniscient) channel model in which Calvin is thought of as an adversarial entity who can maliciously design the error imposed to fit the specific codeword transmitted, [3] . While the capacity of the former model is well understood, that of the latter encompasses numerous open problems in coding and information theory. This state of affairs has lead to the study of several channel models that conceptually lie between the two extreme commu-
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Calvin p (y|x,s) s n x n y n p(z|x) z n Fig. 1 : The myopic channel model. nication models, those in which the channel is oblivious of the transmitted codeword X n and those in which the channel acts as an adversarial jammer. These include, arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs), e.g. [4] - [7] , causal channels, e.g. [8] - [15] , and computationally limited channels, e.g. [16] . Inspired by the study of Sarwate [17] , in this work we consider the model of myopic adversarial jammers. In the myopic setting, the jammer Calvin is still a malicious entity that wishes to carefully design his error to corrupt communication, however his view of the codeword X n is limited in the sense that it is masked through a noisy memoryless channel p(z|x). If the channel between Alice and Calvin is of full rate, the myopic model reduces to that of the standard omniscient adversarial model, and if it is of zero rate, the myopic model captures the model of a "blind" (or "oblivious") adversary that has no knowledge whatsoever on the codeword X n transmitted.
More formally, the myopic model is described by two channels. A memoryless channel p(z|x) from Alice to Calvin and an AVC from Alice to Bob. The AVC is modeled by a state channel p(y|x, s), where the vector of state S n (one state for each time step) is determined by Calvin as a function of his masked view Z n of the transmitted codeword X n . See Figure 1 .
In this work we study the capacity of myopic adversarial channels. We start by studying a natural binary myopic channel in which (i) Calvin may flip at most a p fraction of the bits communicated between Alice and Bob, and (ii) Calvin views X n through a binary symmetric channel with parameter q (i.e., BSC q ). Namely, in our notation, the Hamming weight of S n is at most pn, p(z|x) = q for z = x, and p(y|x, s) = 1 iff y = x + s (and otherwise 0). We ask to find the capacity of the channel under varying values of q, our limitation on the view of Calvin. When q = 0, namely when Calvin has full knowledge of the codeword X n , the channel reduces to the omniscient adversarial channel for which the capacity is a central open problem in coding theory and only upper and lower bounds on capacity exist [18] - [20] . When q = 1/2, namely when Calvin is blind, it is shown in [2] , [6] that the capacity equals that of the channel in which Calvin flips bits randomly, i.e. the BSC p , which equals 1 − H(p).
The focus of this work is in the study of intermediate values of q. In a nutshell, we present a dichotomous behavior of the channel. If Calvin is "sufficiently myopic" then the optimal communication rate is that of a blind Calvin, namely 1−H(p). Specifically, we show that an optimal rate of 1 − H(p) is achievable as long as q > p. If on the other hand q < p, then the capacity of the myopic channel equals that of the omniscient channel, 1 which is known to be bounded away from 1 − H(p) for all p, and in fact equals 0 for all p > 1/4. We extend our results to the setting of secure communication in which one requires that the transmitted message remain secret from Calvin. In this extended setting we show a similar phenomena: as long as q > p the capacity equals that obtained for blind adversaries (which is H(q) − H(p)).
We then turn to study the myopic model in its full generality, for general memoryless channels p(z|x) connecting Alice and Calvin, and general state channels p(y|x, s) connecting Alice and Bob. For the general setting we obtain upper and lower bounds on capacity, both in the standard setting of communication, and in that of secure communication.
As mentioned above, the work most relevant to ours in that of Sarwate [17] in which the myopic channel model is studied under the assumption that Alice and Bob hold shared randomness that is not known to Calvin (i.e., under the assumption of randomized coding). In this setting, a singleletter characterization to the randomized coding capacity is obtained. As with our study, the results in [17] bridge between the randomized capacity when the adversary Calvin is assumed to be blind and that when Calvin has full knowledge of the codeword transmitted.
Although our study was inspired by, and builds on, that of [17] , it differs from [17] in two important aspects. Primarily, and most importantly, we study the case of deterministic codes (in which there is no shared randomness between Alice and Bob). The study of deterministic codes introduces many challenges that do not exist in the case of randomized codes, and involves a new set of analytical tools in its analysis. Secondly, we study the general case in which the codewords X n of Alice and the state space S n of Calvin are constrained. Our enhanced setting was explicitly left open in [17] .
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section II we give a precise model for the myopic setting. In Section III we state our main results. Our results are first presented for the special binary case discussed above and then in full generality. In Section IV we present the main ideas in the proof of our results for the binary bit-flip case.
II. MODEL
The myopic channel is defined by its input alphabet X , output alphabet to Calvin Z, state alphabet S, output alphabet to Bob Y, probability distribution for the channel connecting Alice and Calvin p(z|x), probability distribution p(y|x, s) for the channel connecting Alice and Bob, the state constraint W, and the input constraint V. The three parties of the channel, Alice, Bob, and Calvin are described below (see Figure 1 ). Alice's encoder: Alice has a message U uniformly distributed in {0, 1} nR that she wants to transmit to Bob; R denotes the rate of her message, and n the block-length of Alice's transmissions. To effect this communication, Alice encodes her message using an encoder Enc : {0, 1} nR → X n to output a transmitted vector X n = Enc(u). We emphasize that Alice's encoder is deterministic. The encoder has to satisfy the constraint type(X n ) ∈ V, where V is a set of types over the alphabet X . Channel from Alice to Calvin: Calvin observes the output of X n passing through a memoryless channel p(z|x). More precisely, the channel law is given as P r(Z n |X n ) = t p(z t |x t ). Based on Calvin's non-causal observation Z n , he chooses a length-n state vector S n . The state vector S n is restricted to have type(S n ) ∈ W, where W is a set of types over the alphabet S. Channel from Alice to Bob: Bob observes the output Y n obtained through the channel p(y|x, s). More precisely, for state S n = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) the channel law is given as P r(Y n |X n , S n ) = t p(y t |x t , s t ). Successful communication: Given Y n , Bob decodes a messageû ∈ {0, 1} Rn . Communication is considered successful if the transmitted message u equalsû. The average error in communication is defined as ε = 1 2 Rn u P r(u =û). 2 Rate R is achievable over the myopic channel of for any ε > 0 there exists an block length n such that the average error in communication is at most ε. The channel capacity is the closure of all achievable rates. Secrecy: At times we will study the secrecy (i.e., secure) capacity between Alice and Bob. In this setting, in addition to correct decoding, we require that Calvin's view Z n be independent of Alice's message u, namely that I(Z n ; U ) = 0.
III. OUR RESULTS
In what follows we present our results together with an intuitive description of the techniques we use in our proof. The results are presented first for the special binary myopic channel discussed in the Introduction, and then in generality. 2 Notice that in the setting of deterministic code design the average error criteria is essential for the study of the myopic model (in which we assume that Calvin bases his decisions on a corrupted view of X n ), as otherwise, in the study of maximum error, Calvin may neglect Z n and focus his strategy on a single transmitted codeword, yielding the channel p(z|x) irrelevant to the study of capacity. This state of affairs does not hold once stochastic coding is considered. Connections exist between the study of deterministic codes under the average error criteria and stochastic codes under the maximum error criteria in the context of AVCs, e.g., [5] . In this work we focus on deterministic codes (which we prove are optimal for several of the settings we study).
A. The myopic binary C(q, p) channel
Our studies begin with a special binary channel characterized by the pair of parameters (q, p) in which (i) Calvin views X n through a binary symmetric channel with parameter q (i.e., BSC q ), and (ii) Calvin may flip at most a fraction p of the bits communicated between Alice and Bob. Namely, in our notation, we set X = Z = Y = S = {0, 1}, p(z|x) = q for z = x, p(y|x, s) = 1 iff y = x + s (and otherwise 0), and W = {(1 − p , p )|p ≤ p} (i.e., type(S n ) ∈ W if and only if S n ≤ pn} where · denotes the Hamming weight). We refer to this channel as C(q, p).
We first study the case q > p and prove.
Theorem III.1. For q > p, the capacity of the binary myopic adversarial channel C(q, p) is 1 − H(p). The capacity is achieved by random codes with input distribution Ber(1/2).
To prove Theorem III.1 we must present both an upper and a lower bound on capacity. The upper bound is relatively simple and follows from the fact that Calvin may mimic a memoryless BSC p (no matter what q is). Specifically, Calvin can completely neglect his view Z n and just construct a state vector uniformly at random among those with type (1 − p, p). The converse of the channel coding theorem now shows that the rate in this case is bounded by above 1 − H(p). Our main contribution in the study of C(q, p) is in the achievability part of Theorem III.1 is which we show that one can obtain rates arbitrarily close to 1 − H(p). We present the main ideas governing our proof in Section IV. The technical proof is given in the extended version [22] .
We next study the case of q < p. Here, we show that the capacity equals that of the omniscient adversary.
Theorem III.2. For q < p, the deterministic coding capacity of the binary myopic adversarial channel C(q, p) is the same as that of the binary adversarial channel with an omniscient channel.
To prove Theorem III.2, we assume successful communication at rate R over C(q, p) and show that R is achievable in the omniscient channel model as well. Consider the code that allows communication at rate R. The same code must also allow communication at rate R over BSC q (this follows from the fact that Calvin can mimic BSC q , just as described above in the converse to Theorem III.1). This implies that Calvin, who views X n through a BSC q is able to decode X n . Implying, in turn, that Calvin is actually omniscient.
We finally turn to study the context of secure communication. Here, we first consider the binary symmetric broadcast channel with independent BSC to Bob and Calvin with cross-over probabilities p and q respectively. Then it is well known [21] that the message transmission capacity to Bob under the secrecy condition is H(q) − H(p). An achievability scheme in this case is to append the nR bits of message with n(1 − H(q)) bits of private randomness and encode the resulting string with a random channel code of rate 1 − H(p).
In our channel C(q, p), for q > p, the secrecy capacity is also H(q) − H(p). The encoding can be done in the same way as before: appending random bits to the message and then encoding using a random code. Calvin can not learn anything about the message by the secrecy results in the random channel case discussed above. Since Calvin is sufficiently myopic, by Theorem III.1, Bob can decode the message and the private randomness irrespective of Calvin's strategy. So, we have Theorem III.3. For q > p, the binary myopic channel C(q, p) has secrecy capacity H(q) − H(p).
B. General myopic channels
We now turn to present our results for the myopic model in full generality. To obtain single letter upper and lower bounds on the capacity of myopic channels we consider the types of the vectors X n , Z n , S n , and Y n , and certain distributions on them. Our achievability scheme uses a random code governed by the single letter distribution p X . Let p Z|X be Calvin's channel law (we now explicitly specify the channel as a subscript to avoid confusion). The distributions, p X and p Z|X give rise to a joint distribution p XZ and a marginal distribution p Z . Recall that W is the set of state types of S n which Calvin may impose. Let W S|Z be the set of conditional distributions p S|Z which results in a marginal distribution p S in the set W. Namely, p S|Z is in W S|Z if and only if
Finally, we use p Y |XS (y|x, s) which is given as part of the channel definition. Note that p X and p S|Z define a joint single letter distribution over random variables X, Z, S, Y defined by p X p Z|X p S|Z p Y |XS . The proofs for the general case are given in the extended version [22] .
We are now ready to present our results for the general model. Our first theorem addresses achievability. For technical reasons, we focus only on "deterministic channels", i.e. where Y n is a deterministic function of (X n , S n ).
Theorem III.4. For deterministic p Y |XS a rate R is achievable if there exists a p X ∈ V such that (a) ∀p S|Z ∈ W S|Z : R < I(X; Y ).
Such a rate is achievable using random codes generated using the input distribution p X .
For an upper bound we obtain:
Theorem III.5. A rate R is achievable only if there exists a p X ∈ V such that (a) ∀p S|Z ∈ W S|Z : R < I(X; Y ).
For secret achievability we prove:
Theorem III.6. For deterministic p Y |XS a secrecy rate R is achievable if there exists a p X ∈ V such that (a) ∀p S|Z ∈ W S|Z : R < I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z).
IV. ACHIEVABILITY PROOF FOR THEOREM III.1
In this section we sketch the proof for the achievability of rates arbitrarily close to 1 − H(p) over C(q, p) when q > p (Theorem III.1). During our discussions we refer the reader to the technical proofs appearing in the extended version [22] .
Our code construction uses a uniformly chosen codebook over {0, 1} n and our decoder associates with each received word Y n its closest codeword X n . We now show that with high probability over code design, such codes are sufficient for communication at any rate R = 1−H(p)− and average error where > 0 is arbitrarily small. In what follows, many of the statements we make occur with high probability over code design (and not necessarily with probability 1) even though at times we do not state so explicitly.
Consider a codeword X n transmitted by Alice. This codeword passes through the channel to Calvin, and Calvin receives the corrupted version Z n of X n . The fact that q > p (or more precisely that 1 − H(q) < 1 − H(p)) now implies that there are approximately 2 n(H(q)−H(p)) codewords that are consistent with Calvin's view Z n . Namely, that there are an exponential number of codewords X n , that from Calvin's perspective, may have been transmitted by Alice that would have resulted in the same Z n . These consistent codewords (depicted in Figure 2 ) are exactly those that lie in a ball around Z n of radius ≈ qn.
Calvin doesn't know what X n is and he even doesn't know what d = X n − Z n is exactly (other than the fact that d ≈ qn), however in our analysis we slightly help Calvin by revealing d and by choosing a small yet exponential set of codewords (of size 2 nδ for an appropriately small δ) from Alice's codebook C chosen from the set of all codewords at distance d from Z n , with the additional guarantee that it also contains the true X n . We refer to this set as the oracle-given set M og . The advantage of defining such a set is purely for ease of analysis using a two-stage counting as elaborated later. Conditioned on Calvin's view Z n and M og , each of the codewords in M og is equally likely to have been transmitted. Nonetheless, Calvin still has a reasonable amount of uncertainty about which of the 2 nδ codewords was actually transmitted -indeed, this is the uncertainty that we leverage in our analysis. Revealing this information to Calvin only makes him stronger and thus a coding scheme that succeeds here will also succeed against the original Calvin.
We now show that, no matter what action Calvin takes, Bob will be able to correctly decode with high probability over the transmitted codeword X n of Alice. First consider any codeword X n in the set M og which is consistent with Fig. 2 : Relationship between important notation: Alice transmits X n , Calvin observes Z n . The oracle informs Calvin that Alice's transmission is one of Mog = {X n , X n , X n , X n }, each of which is d ≈ qn away from Z n . Calvin imposes the error vector S n , and Bob receives Y n = X n + S n . Bob decodes to the hopefully unique codeword in a ball of radius pn around Y n . In this example, the ball around X n + S n contains a codeword from C \ Mog, and the ball around X n + S n contains a codewords from Mog, and therefore if Calvin imposes the error-vector S n an error may result in these cases. In our proof, we show that for any S n the fraction of X n ∈ Mog whose decoding balls contain any other codewords is "very small".
Calvin's view Z n . A decoding error occurs for X n if after Calvin chooses the state vector S n it holds that Y n = X n +S n is closer to a codewordX n ∈ C than it is to the transmitted word X n . In such a case we say that X n is confusable witĥ X n . In Figure 2 this is expressed by the shaded region around Y n = X n + S n , if it is empty then decoding is successful and if it includes aX n then a decoding error may occur. Conditioned on Calvin's view Z n , we show that no matter what action Calvin takes, for most codewords in M og there will not be a decoding error. We stress that, indeed, for every action S n there may be some codewords in M og that will have a decoding error, but for the vast majority of them their corresponding shaded region in Figure 2 will be empty. This will imply successful decoding with high probability.
We now fix any specific action S n for Calvin and show that only a small fraction of codewords in M og will be corrupted by S n , or equivalently, only a small fraction of codewords X n will be confusable with someX n ∈ C. We consider two cases: the case thatX n ∈ C \ M og and the case in whicĥ X n ∈ M og . Roughly speaking, using a careful analysis based on the Principle of Deferred Decisions [23] in this case we may assume that the codewords in C\M og are independent of those in M og . This allows us to bound the number of codewords in M og that are confusable with codewords in C \ M og using certain list decoding arguments and in particular using a novel "double-list-decoding lemma".
Recall that X n is confusable withX n iff the latter lies in the ball of radius pn around X n + S n . Let Λ be the union of all such balls for X n ∈ M og . Once C \ M og is independent of M og , it follows from standard list decoding arguments (and our setting of parameters) that the number of codewordsX n ∈ C \ M og that lie in Λ is small, specifically of size at most some polynomial in n. This is a first step towards our proof, which shows that the number ofX n that may confuse some X n ∈ M og is small. However, each sucĥ X n potentially may confuse many X n ∈ M og . To bound the number of X n that may be confused by a singleX n , we use a second list-decoding argument. As before, we use the independence between C\M og and M og to bound this number by a polynomial in n. All in all, we conclude that at most a polynomial number of codewords X n in M og are confusable with a codewordX n in C \ M og , which concludes the first case we considered.
For the second case, we bound the number of codewords X n ∈ M og that are confusable withX n which are also in M og . In this case, we may no longer naïvely rely on the list decoding arguments used previously. This follows from the fact that the previous arguments were strongly based on the independence between codewords that were potentially being confused (denoted by X n ) and those that were confusing them (denoted byX n ). To overcome this difficulty, we partition the set M og into disjoint sets and study the effect of one set in the partition on another. Then by a combination of similar list decoding arguments and additional counting arguments, we can show that only an exponentially small fraction of codewords X n ∈ M og are confused by a codewordX n ∈ C. The claimed list decoding properties above hold with extremely high probability of 1−2 −βn 2 on code design. This allows us to use the union bound on several assumptions made throughout the discussion (e.g., the values of d, z n and s n ).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we study the secure and standard capacity of adversarial myopic channels. For the bit-flipping adversarial channel C(q, p), we characterize these capacities as the capacity under random noise when the adversary's own channel is more noisy than the worst noise it can impose on Bob, in terms of mutual information. For general myopic channels, we prove a similar result under a stricter condition of myopicity. A tight characterization of capacity for general myopic channels is left open and subject of future work.
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